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FLORIDA DEPARTS FROM TRADITION: THE LEGISLATIVE
RESPONSE TO THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CRISIS
JOHN
I.

H.

FRENCH*

INTRODUCTION

The "medical malpractice crisis" emerged in early 1975 when
insurance carriers writing professional liability insurance for physicians suddenly realized that what had traditionally been a profitable market was turning into a financial disaster. Carriers everywhere responded by refusing to renew existing policies or by offering
renewals at astronomically increased premiums. Insurance coverage
for the new physician or for others insured for the first time was
virtually unavailable at any price. The impact of all this on the
medical community touched off shock waves that were soon felt by
the public at large. The situation commanded and received immediate attention from legislative bodies across the nation.
The Florida experience is typical of that in most of the larger
states, both in terms of the chronology of the crisis and the legislative response. Most of the legislation enacted in the medical malpractice area in Florida since 1975 has also been adopted in one form
or another by many other states.' While it is fair to say that Florida
has gone farther than most states in the variety and scope of legislative enactments intended to address the problems of malpractice
insurance, it should be pointed out as well that some states have
adopted measures which are much more extreme in their impact on
2
the traditional tort liability/insurance compensation system.
* Member, The Florida Bar. B.A., Florida State University, 1967; J.D., Florida State
University, 1971. Member, Forum Committee on Health Law of the American Bar Association; member, Florida Bar Select Committee on Professional Liability Insurance; former staff
director, Committee on Elections of the Florida House of Representatives; former executive
director, Democratic Party of Florida. In addition to representing other clients, the author
was Legislative Counsel to the Florida Medical Association during the events described in
this article. He is a solo practitioner of law in Tallahassee.
1. For an extensive review of legislation enacted on a state-by-state basis, see AMERIcAN
MEDICAL Ass'N, 5 STATE HEALTH LEGISLATION REPORT (1977). For further comprehensive treatment of medical malpractice issues, see also U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE,
LEGAL Topics RELATING TO MEDICAL MALPRACTICE

(1977),

and White & McKenna,

Constitutionalityof Recent Malpractice Legislation, 13 FORUM 312 (1977-78).
2. For example, California, Ohio, and South Dakota place ceilings on the amount of
general damages which may be recovered in medical malpractice cases. At least eight other
states have adopted ceilings under certain circumstances. At least 12 states have adopted
statutes regulating attorney fees by placing contingency fees on sliding scales. In addition,
Illinois, Nebraska, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island allow the awarding to defendants of costs
and attorney fees for ill-founded suits or appeals from pretrial screening panels. None of these
measures has been adopted in Florida.
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The purpose of this article is to review the legislative response to
the medical malpractice insurance crisis in Florida. In so doing, an
effort will be made to illustrate the public policy considerations
posed by the malpractice problem as well as the logic underlying the
legislature's proposed solutions. This article is intended to provide
the legal practitioner with a working knowledge of the panoply of
Florida statutes on medical malpractice.

II.

BACKGROUND

The inability of physicians to obtain liability insurance coverage
at affordable premiums must be viewed in terms of its impact on
the general public in order to comprehend the rapid and farreaching response by the Florida Legislature. The reaction of Florida's physicians in early 1975 when professional liability coverage
became virtually unobtainable was predictable. Responsible members of the medical community seriously considered major curtailments of services in order to minimize potential exposure to liability. Older physicians weighed early retirement against risking the
assets they had accumulated over the years. New physicians decided to open their practices in neighboring states where liability
coverage was still available.
The situation posed a clear threat to the availability of quality
health care in Florida. Because the costs of liability insurance premiums are ultimately passed on to the consumer through higher
charges for goods and services, the physicians, confronted with dramatically increased premiums, increased their bills to patients accordingly-thereby adding a new inflationary element to the spiraling cost of health care. Furthermore, the increased practice of
"defensive medicine"-the ordering of a surfeit of x-ray or laboratory studies to confirm the physician's judgment-drove medical
bills even higher.
III.

LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE

In the eyes of Florida legislators, the inability of the physician to
obtain affordable insurance coverage posed the dual threats of unaffordability and unavailability of health care services. Their response
can be categorized into three general areas. The first area includes
provisions designed to assure the availability of medical liability
insurance coverage through mandatory risk pooling by insurance
carriers and by the establishment of alternative insurance mechanisms. The second area includes measures to insure the quality of
medical services and to reduce the incidence of malpractice by identifying and disciplining incompetent or negligent physicians. The
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third includes both procedural and substantive modifications to the
tort system by providing new review mechanisms for highly technical malpractice claims and by altering the basis for damage awards
by juries.
A.

The Medical Malpractice Reform Act of 1975

The Medical Malpractice Reform Act of 19751 was undoubtedly
the broadest and most far-reaching action taken by the Florida
Legislature to address the medical malpractice problem. This Act
contained major substantive provisions in each of the three general
areas described above and provided the basic framework for Florida's present statutory scheme in the malpractice field.
In an effort to make professional liability insurance more readily
available, the legislature mandated the formation of a temporary
joint underwriting association (JUA) composed of all insurance carriers writing casualty insurance in the state.' The JUA is analogous
to the "assigned risk pool" for automobile liability insurance. It
forces carriers to participate in writing malpractice coverage as a
requirement for writing other types of casualty coverage in Florida.
The JUA is designed as a stop-gap measure to provide an insurance
market until the "crisis," as reflected by premium levels, stabilizes
or subsides. The legislature voted to extend the life of the JUA in
1978 following a finding that an adequate voluntary market still did
5
not exist.
In addition to mandating the availability of coverage through the
private market, the 1975 Act also allowed the establishment of selfinsurance trusts by groups of health care providers.6 After receiving
approval from the Department of Insurance, these groups may selfinsure and may purchase basic and/or specific excess coverage as
well as aggregate excess coverage. Such trusts are tightly regulated
by the department according to the actuarial soundness of the
premimum structure and the capability of management personnel
or consultants.
One of the most innovative features of the 1975 Act was the establishment of the Patient's Compensation Fund (Fund).7 The Fund is
intended to provide liability coverage in excess of basic policy limits
for participating health care providers and hospitals. It was made
3.
4.
5.
house
6.
7.

Ch. 75-9, 1975 Fla. Laws 13 (current version in scattered sections of FLA. STAT. (1977)).
Id. § 14 (current version at FLA. STAT. § 627.351(7) (1977)).
SB 481 by Senator John Ware and others was approved by both the senate and the
and sent to the Governor on-May 9, 1978.
Ch. 75-9, § 4, 1975 Fla. Laws 13 (current version at FLA. STAT. § 627.357 (1977)).
Id. § 15 (current version at FLA. STAT. § 768.54(3) (1977)).
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necessary by the almost total lack of a viable excess insurance market. All hospitals must participate in the Fund unless they obtain
satisfactory alternative coverage. An annual premium based on the
number of beds in each facility must be paid. Other health care
providers have the option of joining the Fund upon a showing of
financial responsibility for the first $100,000 of any claim and upon
payment of a base premium plus an adjusted premium based on the
8
type and the location of practice.
The statute absolves participants in the Fund from any liability
in excess of $100,000, the portion of any settlement or judgment over
this amount being paid from the Fund While there is no limit as
to the total amount a claimant may recover from the Fund, the
legislature amended the statute in 1976 to limit actual payment to
a single individual, based on a single occurrence, to $100,000 per
year to insure the continuing solvency of the Fund." Costs and
attorneys' fees, however, must be paid in a lump sum and are not
subject to the $100,000 limitation. When combined with the basic
coverage available through the JUA or through a self-insurance
trust, the Fund provides a health care provider with the opportunity
to insure himself completely against a malpractice judgmentassuming, of course, affordable premiums.
The second area of major significance in the 1975 Act relates to
the prevention of patient injuries. The Act provides for the disciplining of errant health care providers and for the identification of
recurring injury situations in hospitals." What was widely misinterpreted as a lack of desire on the part of the medical community to
"police its own ranks" was actually, in most cases, a lack of the
statutory disciplinary power to do so.
While Florida led the nation in progressive medical licensure in
terms of sanctions against physicians who were incapacitated due
to alcohol or drug-related problems (the "Sick Doctor Act"), 2 the
Florida Board of Medical Examiners lacked the power to discipline
a licensee for practicing bad medicine. Furthermore, hospital medi8. Physicians are categorized into five rating classifications depending on specialty and
the nature of practice. A Class I physician (a general practitioner, etc.) pays significantly
lower rates than a physician in Class V (orthopedic surgeons, anesthesiologists, etc.), due to
the obvious differences in the level of risk involved in their respective practices. In addition,
Florida is divided into two geographic rating areas. Dade and Broward Counties comprise one
area by themselves, and the rest of Florida comprises the second area. This differentiation is
based on the high frequency and severity of claims emanating from these two counties, as
opposed to the rest of the state.
9. FLA. STAT. § 768.54(2)(a)-(b) (1977).
10. Ch. 76-260, § 6, 1976 Fla. Laws 660 (current version at FLA. STAT. § 768.54 (1977)).
11. Ch. 75-9, §§ 12-13, 1975 Fla. Laws 13.
12. FLA. STAT. § 458.1201(1)(n), (2) (1977).
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cal staffs and similar local professional groups lacked the authority
to impose sanctions on members. Peer pressure-the only available
sanction-was ineffective in most situations.
Section 12 of the 1975 Act vested the board with broad new powers
to suspend or revoke licenses for practicing bad medicine.3 A finding of liability for medical malpractice, a finding of guilt for negligence, or the imposition of disciplinary action by a hospital staff or
a similar body now subjects a physician to an array of potential
professional sanctions ranging from limitations on his practice to
permanent license revocation. It is significant to note that the board
now has the tools to rehabilitate a physician, while protecting the
public from that physician's lack of ability during the rehabilitation
period.
Hospital medical staffs were given similar powers in section 13 of
the Act." This provision allows the staff to "suspend, deny, revoke,
or curtail the staff privileges of any staff member for good cause
,,," Good cause includes incompetence, negligence, an adjudi...
cation of liability based on malpractice, and habitual use of intoxicants or drugs. The staff and its individual members are held harmless from liability for imposing these sanctions if such actions are
"without malice or fraud."'
In a related provision, hospitals having more than three hundred
beds were required by the 1975 Act to establish an internal risk
management program designed to identify the causes of patient
injuries and to take appropriate preventive measures to minimize
the potential for such injuries.' 7 This was a major step toward loss
prevention and, when combined with the new disciplinary powers
described above, represented a significant movement toward reducing injuries and reducing possible malpractice claims.
The third major area of the 1975 Act provided for both substantive and procedural modifications of the tort system as it applies to
medical malpractice litigation. The most significant provision in
this area was the establishment of the medical liability mediation
8
panel system for pretrial review of potential malpractice claims.
The mediation panel system is based on the precept that medical
malpractice litigation is highly technical and deals with scientific
data and professional judgments which are beyond the comprehen13. Ch. 75-9, § 12, 1975 Fla. Laws 13 (current version at FLA. STAT. § 458.1201(1)(o)-(p)
(1977)).
14. Id. § 13 (current version at FLA. STAT. § 395.065 (1977)).
15. FLA. STAT. § 395.065(1) (1977).
16. Id. § 768.40(2).
17. Ch. 75-9, § 3, 1975 Fla. Laws 13 (current version at FLA. STAT. § 768.41 (1977)).
18. Id. §§ 5-6 (current version at FLA. STAT. § 768.44 (1977)).
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sion of the average juror. The commonality of experience which
exists in situations in which jurors deal with questions of everyday
life (such as driving automobiles) is simply not present in a malpractice context. The mediation panel-composed of a doctor, lawyer, and judge-is intended to provide an intermediate level of expert review for purposes of weeding out unworthy claims and for
facilitating settlements where recoverable injuries have occurred. 9
Under the statute, any claim based on allegations of medical
malpractice must be submitted to mediation as a prerequisite to
filing an action in circuit court. The defendant has twenty days in
which to file his response to the claim or the jurisdiction of the
mediation panel lapses, allowing the claimant to proceed to court.
In effect, this provision gives the defendant the option of mediating
or taking his chances in court, while the claimant is denied this
alternative. If the defendant chooses to mediate-and most do-the
full array of discovery tools that would be available in other types
of litigation conducted pursuant to the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure is available to both parties.
Hearings are conducted by the panel in accordance with rules set
forth by the Florida Supreme Court.20 Parties may call witnesses,
introduce evidence, and cross-examine witnesses of the opposing
party. Within thirty days after the hearing, the panel makes a written finding as to whether the defendant was "actionably negligent"
in his care or treatment of the claimant. Findings of the panel as to
liability, or the lack thereof, are admissible as evidence in any subsequent trial and may be commented on like any other evidence.
The jury, however, is instructed that the findings of the panel are
not binding and should be given no greater weight than other evidence.
While medical mediation panels have existed for a relatively short
time and no formal data have been collected on a statewide basis
quantifying the results of panel activity to date, most observers feel
that the mediation panel system is an unqualified success. The
settlement of meritorious claims is being expedited, claims lacking
merit are being weeded out, and truly disputed claims are still going
to the jury. The panels appear to provide an effective screening
mechanism without imposing undue hardship on the participants.
And the jury system is functioning in its purest form-settling true
disputes.
19. For further material on the concepts of pretrial mediation and arbitration, see Ladimer & Solomon, Medical MalpracticeArbitration:Laws, Programs,Cases, 1977 INs. L. Joust.
335. See also Nocas, Arbitration of Medical Malpractice Claims, 13 FoRUM 254 (1977-78).
20. See Fla. Rules for Mediation Panels as adopted by the Supreme Court of Florida.
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As might have been expected, though, the constitutionality of the
mediation panels was challenged almost immediately following the
enactment of the statute.
On July 18, 1975, eighteen days after the effective date of the 1975
Act, Nellie Mae Sparkman filed suit in Brevard County Circuit
Court alleging that she had been injured by the negligence of Dr.
James Carter. Defendant Carter moved for dismissal of her action
because she had not submitted it to mediation in accordance with
the provisions of the Act. Plaintiff Sparkman responded by asserting the unconstitutionality of the mediation panel sections of the
Act on several grounds. The trial court concurred with her assertions
and held the new statute unconstitutional as abrogating the plaintiffs due process of law, equal protection of law, and timely access
to the courts.2
On appeal, the Florida Supreme Court reversed the trial court
and held the mediation panel statute constitutional. 22 To reach this
conclusion, the court had to provide judicial interpretations of certain provisions of the statute in order to render it valid. In so doing,
the court reasoned:
It is incumbent on this Court when reasonably possible and
consistent with constitutional rights to resolve all doubts as to the
validity of a statute in favor of its constitutional validity and if
possible a statute should be construed in such a manner as would
be consistent with the constitution, that is in such
a way as to
3
remove it farthest from constitutional infirmity.
The court went on to recognize that there are a number of conditions which the legislature may place on a person's right of access
to the courts as a valid exercise of the state police powers in the
areas of public health and welfare. Reflecting on the crisis atmosphere surrounding the passage of the Act as expressed in the socalled "Whereas Clause," the court held that the Act was valid in
the light of the "imminent danger to public health" existing at that
time:
The Legislature felt it incumbent upon itself to attempt to resolve
the crisis through exercise of the police power for the general health
and welfare of the citizens of this State and accordingly enacted
Chapter 75-9, Laws of Florida, to effectuate that purpose. The
21.
22.
23.

Carter v. Sparkman, 335 So. 2d 802, 804 (Fla. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1041 (1977).
335 So. 2d at 806.
Id. at 805.
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statutes involved here deal with matters related directly to public
health and obviously have for their purpose an effort to have the
parties mediate claims for malpractice thereby reducing the cost
of medical malpractice insurance and ultimately medical expen24
ses.
Yet, in an apparent admonition to the legislature, the court went
on to state: "Even though the pre-litigation burden cast upon the
claimant reaches the outer limits of constitutional tolerance, we do
not deem it sufficient to void the medical malpractice law.""
Justice Roberts, writing for the majority, was joined by Chief
Justice Overton and Justices Adkins, Boyd, Sundberg, and Hatchett. Chief Justice Overton and Justices Sundberg and Hatchett also
joined, however, in a special concurring opinion by Justice England.26 After accepting the premise stated by the majority that the
legislature validly exercised its police powers in the light of an apparent public health crisis, Justice England analyzed Sparkman's
constitutional arguments and decided they held no real merit. He
expressed concern over the equities of requiring a plaintiff to mediate while giving defendants the option of participation. But he
concluded:
While I find the inequity in this procedure harsh to a large and
undefined class of litigants, I cannot in good conscience invalidate
the statute on that basis. A disparity of resources has always been
an imbalance in litigation which the courts are relatively powerless
to adjust. Accordingly, although I might have preferred a more
delicate balance for this type of litigation, I cannot conclude that
the Legislature was unreasonable in setting a procedure
for this
2
class of lawsuit which has widened existing disparities.
Three important observations may be made concerning Justice
England's concurring opinion in Carter. First, it is totally lacking
in the implications of unconstitutionality which permeate Justice
Roberts' opinion, for there is nothing in Justice England's words to
suggest that the legislature had reached "the outer limits of constitutional tolerance." Nor are there similar admonitions. To the contrary, the clear thrust of the concurring opinion is that, while the
legislature might have used more restraint, it acted in a constitutionally valid manner. 8
24. Id. at 806.
25. Id.
26.
27.
28.

Id.
Id. at 808.
Id. at 807.
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Second, Justice England recognized a growing trend toward alternatives to the court system as the initial point of entry for disputes.
In referring to the mediation panel as a mechanism for the screening
and resolution of disputes, he looked to the future, stating: "In fact,
it is likely that the Legislature will more frequently attempt to
accommodate the resolution of individual disputes without the use
of the judiciary in areas where other forums or procedures can read'29
ily provide adequate dispute adjustment.
The third observation adds current relevance to the first two in
that, as of this writing, Justice England and the three justices concurring in his opinion constitute a majority of the Florida Supreme
Court. Those who take comfort in Justice Roberts' admonition concerning the "outer limits of constitutional tolerance" must shudder
at the fact that a majority of the present court clearly recognized
the wide latitude which must be afforded to the legislature in the
valid exercise of its police powers.
Another major modification by the 1975 Act was a shortening of
the statute of limitations for medical malpractice claims. Previously, the limitation extended two years from the time the cause
of action was discovered or should have been discovered through the
exercise of due diligence. This virtually open-ended period rendered
calculation of insurance rates extremely difficult in that reserves
had to be allocated for claims which potentially could be filed years
in the future. Furthermore, statistics tended to indicate that the
vast majority of all claims were reported during the first few years
after the date of injury.3
The Act provided for a statute of limitations of two years from the
time the incident occurred or within two years from the time at
which the incident is discovered or should have been discovered
29. Id. "Mediation panels" in varying forms have been implemented in a number of
jurisdictions and, as would be expected, have met with diverse judicial fates in terms of
constitutionality. Panels have been upheld in Arizona (Eastin v. Broomfield, 570 P.2d 744
(Ariz. 1977)); Nebraska (Prendergast v. Nelson, 256 N.W.2d 657 (Neb. 1977)); New York
(Comiskey v. Arlen, 390 N.Y.S.2d 122 (App. Div. 1976)); Pennsylvania (Parker v. Children's
Hosp., No. 1424 (Philadelphia County Common Pleas 1977)). They have been held unconstitutional in Illinois (Wright v. Central Du Page Hosp. Ass'n, 347 N.E.2d 736 (Ill. 1976));
Maryland (Johnson v. Burch, No. 111-978-6-099191 (Baltimore County June 6, 1977)); Tennessee (Arnold v. State, No. A-6030 (Tenn. Ch. App. Dec. 4, 1975)-remanded for consideration of amendments by Tennessee Legislature).
30. Data from the Insurance Services Office, the statistical and actuarial clearinghouse
for most major liability insurers, indicate that between 88% and 95% of all injuries resulting
in claims are reported within the first 24 months following the injury, and that 97% of all
claims are reported within 48 months. See Insurance Services Office, Special Malpractice
Review: 1974 Closed Claim Survey Preliminary Analysis of Survey Results 24-30 (Dec. 1,
1975). Similar studies in Florida and around the nation verify the fact that all but a very few
injuries are reasonably discoverable within the shortened statute of limitations.
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through the exercise of due diligence, but in no event later than four
years from the date of the incident.3 1 However, the Act provided an
exception where the injury is not discovered because of fraud, concealment, or intentional misrepresentation of fact by the health care
provider, in which case the statute runs for two years from the date
of discovery up to a maximum of seven years. Research indicates no
Florida cases to date in which the statute has been extended for any
32
of these reasons.
The Act included three additional modifications of the tort system as it relates to medical malpractice. As a predicate to a cause
of action for breach of contract against a health care provider, guarantees or similar assurances of the results of the medical procedure
were required to be put in writing, thus placing them within the
Statute of Frauds.3 3 Second, statutory criteria for informing a patient of the risks involved in a given medical procedure were set
forth to establish a standard of recovery based on assault and battery due to the lack of "informed consent on the part of the patient. ' ' 3 Third, the statute also provided that in all actions brought
to recover damages for personal injury or wrongful death (as opposed to medical malpractice only), the amount of general damages
sought may not be stated in the complaint other than for purposes
of establishing the requisite jurisdictional amount. 35 This so-called
"ad damnum" clause is intended to prevent the enhancement of
public expectations as to the amount of damages recoverable in
medical malpractice litigation which might result from newspaper
headlines concerning complaints seeking multi-million dollar
amounts in general damages.
In summary, the Medical Malpractice Reform Act of 1975 reflected a comprehensive approach by the Florida Legislature to the
malpractice insurance crisis then at hand. With a few notable exceptions, which will be discussed below, legislative activity in this
area in subsequent sessions has focused on improving the content
of the 1975 Act rather than on breaking new conceptual ground.
31. Ch. 75-9, § 7, 1975 Fla. Laws 13 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 95.11(4) (1977)). Note that
the filing of a claim in medical mediation tolls the applicable statute of limitations until the
written decision or verdict is issued or the jurisdiction of the mediation panel is terminated.
FLA. STAT. § 768.44(4) (1977); see, e.g., Nardone v. Reynolds, 333 So. 2d 25 (Fla. 1976);
Salvaggio v. Austin, 336 So. 2d 1282 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
32. For a differing point of view as to the fairness of Florida's statute of limitations in
medical malpractice actions, see Note, The Florida Medical MalpracticeAct of 1975, 4 FLA.
ST. U.L. REv. 50 (1976). The author, however, in her dogmatic defense of the tort system,
fails to recognize that any statute of limitations is a balancing of the rights of the injured
individual against those of society in terms of affordable insurance in all litigable areas.
33. Ch. 75-9, § 10, 1975 Fla. Laws 13 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 725.01 (1977)).
34. Id. § 11 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 768.042 (1977)).
35. Id. §§ 8-9 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 768.46 (1977)).
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B.

1976 and 1977 Legislative Changes

Contrary to the hopes and expectations of the Florida Legislature
and almost everyone else, the "malpractice crisis" did not subside
following the enactment of the 1975 legislation. In fact, the crisis
atmosphere seemed to intensify in the succeeding months. The
newly formed JUA announced a premium structure which was considerably higher than the rates being paid by Florida physicians six
months earlier. As previously mentioned, the medical mediation
statute was immediately challenged and subsequently invalidated
on constitutional grounds in a number of judicial circuits. Thus, no
track record was established as to the impact of the mediation panels on the frequency and severity of malpractice claims. With insurance rates continuing to escalate and with a crisis atmosphere permeating both the medical community and the public at large, the
legislature was confronted once again in 1976 with medical malpractice as a major issue.
As is typical in Florida politics, the senate and the house of representatives took very different approaches to the malpractice problem. The house approach was to concentrate almost entirely on tort
system modifications, while the senate placed its primary emphasis
on developing an alternative compensatory mechanism for malpractice claims. The end product was a partial synthesis of both approaches which was once again incorporated into an omnibus medi36
cal malpractice act: chapter 76-269, Laws of Florida.
The 1976 Act established an entirely novel mechanism for the
early identification and compensation of potential medical malpractice claims through the establishment of the "Medical Incident
Committee" concept.3 7 This mechanism uses the risk management
requirements of the 1975 Act as a point of departure and is based
on the pervasive belief among insurance claims adjusters that "the
sooner you get to the injured person and make him happy, the less
it's going to cost you." The system also envisions handling the preponderance of potential claims at the hospital level instead of burdening the insurance system with the extremely heavy costs which
are inherent in litigating a claim through the judicial process. The
overriding desires of the legislature in establishing the committees
appear to be twofold: (1) to avoid potential litigation, and (2) to
36. Ch. 76-260, 1976 Fla. Laws 660 (current version in scattered sections of FLA. STAT. chs.
626, 768 (1977)). Persons desirous of reconstructing the tortuous route by which the 1976 Act
became law should review the legislative history of Senate Bill 586 (1976) and thus the various
house and senate bills which were eventually included or rejected. The journals of the respective legislative bodies provide an arena for this perverse form of scholarly recreation.
37. Id. §§ 2-4 (current version of § 2 at FLA. STAT. § 768.41; §§ 3-4 repealed 1977).
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fulfill the moral obligation of compensating a patient who is injured
through no fault of his own.
The Act required every hospital or other health care facility in the
state to establish a medical incident committee composed of two
members of the hospital governing body and two members of the
medical staff. Members of the hospital staff as well as other hospital
employees were placed under an affirmative duty to report any patient injuries to a risk manager named by the hospital. The risk
manager screens these reports and submits legitimate patient injuries to the medical incident committee.
The primary function of the committee is to determine whether
a compensable injury has occurred and whether compensation
should be offered to the patient. The legislature set forth criteria for
making these decisions. The Act requires at least a nuance of fault
before the committee is authorized to make an offer.8 The committee is vested with wide latitude as to whether to make an offer.
Although the legislature was unwilling to deny the right to file a
future civil action to a patient who accepted compensation, it nevertheless perceived a need to incorporate some form of deterrent to
keep the patient from accepting compensation from the hospital
and then using this compensation to finance subsequent litigation.
Accordingly, the legislature limited the amount of general damages
which a patient who accepted compensation could recover in a subsequent lawsuit to $250,000-a figure most observers believed at the
time to be too high to serve as an effective deterrent. In addition,
the Act provided that an amount equal to the compensation received by the patient plus the fair value of any free medical treatment or other services received by him would be deducted from the
amount of any damages eventually awarded.
Possibly the most unique (and definitely the most controversial)
aspect of the system was that a medical incident committee had the
right to levy an assessment against a physician or other health care
provider whose negligence was determined to have been the cause
of a patient injury, should the patient decide to accept an offer of
compensation. 9 Such determinations were subject to arbitration
and judicial review. The ability of the committee to make determinations which were binding on physicians and, more importantly,
on their insurance carriers, drew a highly unfavorable response from
both the medical community and the insurance industry.
Almost immediately after the 1976 Act became law, the Board of
38.
39.

See ch. 76-260, § 3(6), 1976 Fla. Laws 660 (repealed 1977), for review criteria.
Id. § 4(2)-(3) (repealed 1977).
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Governors of the JUA sought to have the medical incident committee system declared unconstitutional on a number of groundsincluding an alleged lack of due process and the denial of a trial by
jury. 0 The trial court held the medical incident committee system
unconstitutional on several grounds, (including the denial of due
process of law, trial by jury, equal protection of the law, and abrogation of the right to contract). In addition, the court declared
the entire 1976 Act violative of article 3, section 6 of the Florida
Constitution, which prohibits the inclusion of more than one subject
matter in a legislative enactment.4 While an appeal was taken to
the Florida Supreme Court, it appeared that a decision of that court
would not be rendered until well after the beginning of the 1977
legislative session. Therefore, the incoming legislative leadership
decided that the only way to establish a reasonablm level of certainty and stability in the medical malpractice area was to reenact
the 1976 legislation in a constitutionally acceptable form.
Consequently, the legislature revisited the medical incident committee system early in the 1977 session and decided to strengthen
the medical incident reporting mechanism while abolishing the concept of patient compensation. 2 The legislation mandated the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services to promulgate rules
governing the establishment of internal risk management programs
in individual hospitals. Such programs were to include mandatory
incident reporting, professional risk managers, and categorization of
incident reports to identify and correct problem areas.4 3 As will be
discussed in detail later, the legislature also reenacted the provisions of the 1976 Act which made significant modifications in the
tort system.
While the medical incident committee system never had an effective opportunity to operate, its creation alone reflected a growing
frustration on the part of the legislature with the tort liability system as it currently functions in our judicial process. It also evidenced a legislative willingness to experiment with alternative compensation systems. Many observers feel that the concepts embodied
40. Florida Medical Malpractice Joint Underwriting Ass'n v. Shevin, No 76-2792 (Fla.
2d Cir. Ct. Feb. 28, 1977), rev'd and remanded, 352 So. 2d 174 (Fla. 1977).
41. Id.
42. Ch. 77-64, § 2, 1977 Fla. Laws 98, 100 (repealed FLA. STAT. §§ 768.42-.43 (Supp. 1976)).
43. Id. § 1, at 99 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 768.41 (1977)). As of January, 1978, the
Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services had not yet promulgated new risk management rules and could not provide a target date for promulgation. The inability of the department to fulfill its statutory responsibility in this area denies an early test of the prelitigation
intervention mechanism that is central to the risk management concept and which many see
as providing solutions to the problems that exist in this area.
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in the medical incident committee system are sound from both the
limited perspective of proven insurance principles and the broader
perspective of good public policy. It is not unreasonable to speculate
that similar concepts in a more functional, as well as more constitutionally acceptable, form will be considered by the legislature in
future years as it seeks to address medical malpractice as well as
other problem areas of the tort liability system.
The other major area of the 1976 Act greatly modified some of the
traditional bedrock principles of the tort system. Perhaps the most
significant tort modification in the Act was the abrogation of the
common law "collateral source rule" in medical malpractice situations.4 As every first-year law student knows, the collateral source
rule provides that a defendant is not entitled to a credit for amounts
which may be paid to the plaintiff as compensation for his losses
from "collateral sources," such as insurance policies and wage continuation plans. The rule originated at a time when it was contrary
to public policy for a tortfeasor to be able to insure against his
negligent acts. Under this "punishment theory" of tort liability, it
was considered unjust for the defendant to benefit fortuitously from
the ability of the plaintiff to obtain collateral sources.
The rule is theoretically sound in the absence of insurance. It
must be remembered, however, that all types of insurance are based
on a gamble on the part of the insurer that he can collect a little
money from a lot of people and will only have to pay a lot of money
to a few from whom he has collected. In other words, the premium
dollars of many individuals go to pay the loss incurred by only one.
The practical effect of the application of the collateral source rule
where first- and/or third-party insurance is present is that the plaintiff often recovers more than 100% of his actual economic loss at the
expense of the premium-paying public. It may well be that there are
social considerations which justify this overpayment, but the traditional reasoning behind the collateral source rule is no longer applicable in an insurance-oriented society.
Under the provisions of the 1976 Act, the trial court is required
to reduce the amount of any award of damages based on medical
malpractice by the total of all amounts paid or to be paid to the
claimant from all collateral sources which are available to him. 5
Collateral sources include payments from governmental programs
such as social security, all types of health, income disability, automobile, and other types of insurance (except life insurance), and
44.
45.

Ch. 76-260, § 11, 1976 Fla. Laws 660 (current version at FLA.
Id.

STAT.

§ 768.50 (1977)).
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any type of wage continuation or medical benefit plan provided by
employers."
This modification provides further evidence of a legislative willingness to make each component of the system stand up to a critical
analysis in terms of its applicability to modem society. It also evinces the strong political and social pressures generated by the
"medical malpractice crisis "-pressure strong enough to move the
legislature from the traditionally safe shelter of the status quo.
In reenacting this provision, the 1977 legislature considered how
courts would ascertain the amount of collateral sources to be received in the future. The exact amount of future medical expenses
to be paid by the plaintiff's health insurance, the extent to which
his inability to work in the future would require him to draw on an
income disability plan, and the uncertainty of other such variables,
raised the specter of perpetrating an injustice on the injured party
by reducing his claim by amounts which he might not actually
receive in the future. The provision was thus amended to require an
offset of only those collateral sources which have already been received by the plaintiff at the time of the award.47 The balance of the
statute was reenacted intact.
The 1976 Act incorporated another significant modification of the
traditional tort system by providing for the periodic payment of
future damages in certain instances in medical malpractice claims
in lieu of the requirement that judgments be paid in a lump sum.48
In malpractice awards where the amount of future damages exceeds
$200,000 the court may, at the request of either party, enter a judgment ordering that future damages be paid in whole or in part by
such periodic payments. The total of such payments must equal the
amount of all future damages before any reduction to present value.
The period of time over which the payments are made is the life
expectancy of the plaintiff or such other period of years as may be
determined by the trier of fact. The judgment debtor is required to
post a security to insure that payments will be made when due.
Under the 1976 Act, if the claimant died prior to the termination
of the period of years during which the payments were to be made,
the liability of the defendant for amounts intended to compensate
for future medical expenses and future pain and suffering would
cease. At the same time, the outstanding balance of amounts
intended to compensate for future lost wages and other economic
losses would be paid into the estate of the claimant in a lump sum.
46.
47.
48.

Id.
Ch. 77-64, § 7, 1977 Fla. Laws 98, 109 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 768.50 (1977)).
Ch. 76-260, § 14, 1976 Fla. Laws 660 (current version at FLA. STAT. § 768.51 (1977)).
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However, should the claimant outlive the period of years over which
the payments are to be made, he would not be entitled to receive
any payments beyond that time. In revisiting this provision in 1977,
the legislature, believing a claimant should be entitled to continue
receiving periodic payments if he were fortunate enough to outlive
his life expectancy, incorporated this requirement into the new
law.49 Other provisions of this statute were left intact.
In order to facilitate periodic payments, it was necessary that
provision be made for the trier of fact to apportion an award of
damages into amounts intended to compensate for past and future
losses as well as to categorize these amounts in terms of awards for
general and special damages. The 1977 legislature adopted language
requiring that medical malpractice verdicts be itemized as to
amounts intended to compensate for past and future medical expenses, past and future lost wages, and other such economic losses on
the one hand, and amounts intended to compensate for past and
future general damages, such as pain and suffering and loss of companionship, on the other. 5° In awarding future damages, the trier of
fact is also required to set forth the period of years over which such
amounts are intended to provide compensation. This provision was
reenacted verbatim in 1977.11
In another provision of the 1976 Act, subsequently reenacted in
1977, the legislature adopted a statutory standard of care for health
care providers.52 This has the effect of defining medical negligence
in terms of a breach of the "accepted standard of care." The
"accepted standard of care" is posed in terms of "that level of care,
skill, and treatment which is recognized by a reasonably prudent
similar health care provider as being acceptable under similar conditions and circumstances."5 3
The significance of the provision is found in the term "similar
health care provider," which reveals adoption by the legislature of
the so-called locality rule for general practitioners and a national
standard of care rule for specialists.5 4 Clearly the legislature did not
intend to establish rigid standards for the qualification of expert
witnesses based solely on whether the proposed expert is a "similar
health care provider" to the defendant. The provision allows the
qualification of an expert witness if, to the satisfaction of the court,
49. Ch. 77-64, § 10, 1977 Fla. Laws 98 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 768.51 (1977)).
50. Ch. 76-260, § 13, 1976 Fla. Laws 660 (current version at FIA. STAT. § 768.48 (1977)).
51. Ch. 77-64, § 9, 1977 Fla. Laws 98 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 768.48(2) (1977)).
52. Ch. 76-260, § 12, 1976 Fla. Laws 660, reenacted by ch. 77-64, § 8, 1977 Fla. Laws 98
(codified at FLA. STAT. § 768.45 (1977)).
53. FLA. STAT. § 768.45(1) (1977).
54. Id. § 768.45(2)(a)-(b).
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he "possesses sufficient training, experience, and knowledge to provide such expert testimony as to the acceptable standard of care in
a given cause." 55
Another significant provision of this statute precludes the application of res ipsa loquitur in medical malpractice cases except in
instances where the cause of action is based on the presence of a
medically unnecessary foreign body such as a sponge or a clamp. 5
The final provision of the 1976 Act which dealt with the tort
system codified the common law doctrines of remittitur and additur
in medical malpractice situations.57 This provision allows the trial
court a great deal of latitude in reviewing the adequacy or inadequacy of jury verdicts and in proposing changes in such verdicts
through a modified application of these traditional common law
principles. Upon proper motion, the court is required to review an
award to determine if it is "clearly excessive or inadequate in light
of the facts and circumstances which were presented to the trier of
fact."- This is a significant departure from the traditional standard
of whether the award "shocks the judicial conscience."
Specific criteria for determining excessiveness or inadequacy are
set forth in the statute and generally reflect the traditional case law
standards for remittitur and additur 9 However, the final criterion,
"[w]hether the amount awarded is supported by the evidence and
is such that it could be adduced in a logical manner by reasonable
persons," is a significant modification of the "clear error" standard
which characterized the common law in this area. 0 This criterion
places the trial judge in the place of the trier of fact in determining
whether the award is reasonable in the light of the evidence presented. It may result in an increased level of judicial activism in
reviewing the jury product.
If, after applying the statutory criteria, the court finds that the
amount awarded by the jury is clearly excessive or clearly inadequate, it will increase or decrease the award accordingly. If the party
adversely affected by such an order does not concur, the court will
order a new trial in the cause as to the issue of damages. This
provision was reenacted by the 1977 legislature.6'
55. Id. § 768.45(2)(c). For a discussion of expert testimony in medical malpractice actions,
see Saunetro v. Nystrom, 345 So. 2d 1059 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
56. FLA. STAT. § 768.45(4) (1977).
57. Ch. 76-260, § 15, 1976 Fla. Laws 660 (current version at FLA. STAT. § 768.49 (1977)).
58. FLA. STAT. § 768.49(1) (1977).
59. Id. § 768.49(2)(a)-(d).
60. Id. § 768.49(2)(e).
61. Ch. 77-64, § 11, 1977 Fla. Laws 98 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 768.49 (1977)).
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CONSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS

As of this writing, no cases have been reported in Florida's appellate courts which speak to the constitutionality of the 1977 Act.
However, a discussion of the constitutional implications of the Act
is in order in that many of its provisions impose major modifications
on the tort system as it existed prior to the so-called "Malpractice
Wars" of 1975-77. In addition, many of these modifications apply
only to litigation in the area of medical malpractice, thus immediately raising major constitutional issues concerning the equal protection of the laws.
Carter v. Sparkman provides the most expansive and illuminating statement of Florida law in terms of the wide latitude which is
vested in the legislature in wielding the police powers of the state.
The medical mediation panel statute was upheld there despite the
fact that: (1) its application is limited to one category of litigation-medical malpractice; (2) the plaintiff is denied immediate
access to the courts due to the necessity of submitting his or her
claim to mediation; and (3) the plaintiff is required to mediate,
while the defendant has the option of mediating or going directly to
court.
It would appear, in the light of Carter, that the court would require a clear abrogation of a fundamental constitutional provision
in order to invalidate a legislative exercise of the police powers. The
provisions of the 1977 Act should be construed with this in mind.
Even in the absence of Carter, however, sufficient precedent exists
at both the state and the federal level to justify a conclusion that
the provisions of the 1977 Act will meet the various tests of constitutional validity."2
V.

CONCLUSION

It would appear as of this writing that the "medical malpractice
crisis" is over-at least for the present. Although professional liability insurance rates for health care providers have not decreased and
probably never will, the rate increase has lessened considerably and
appears to be stabilizing. 3 A viable insurance market exists in Florida today through the JUA as well as through several physicianowned insurance companies and self-insurance trusts. There are
62. E.g., consider the procedure established for litigating workmen's compensation cases
through an industrial claims court pursuant to FLA. STAT. ch. 440 (1977).
63. This conclusion is drawn through an examination of reports by insurers and by the
JUA, which are filed with the Department of Insurance, and from verbal reports given by the
department to the House Commerce Committee in early 1978.
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even preliminary indications that one or more of the established
national insurance carriers is interested in reentering the professional liability insurance market. Most important, however, the
medical community and the general public seem to have adjusted
to the situation. The attention of both the public and the legislature
appears to have shifted to new crises.
The medical malpractice insurance situation which emerged in
early 1975 was not an isolated incident resulting from a unique
relationship among the medical community, the insurance industry,
the judicial system, and the public at large. Rather, it would seem
to be the harbinger of things to come, in that similar "crises" are
emerging in the areas of products liability, workmen's compensation, automobile liability, and liability for attorneys, architects, certified public accountants, and other professionals.64
It would appear in retrospect that the medical community had
the unfortunate experience of being at the point of initial contact
in a monumental collision of conflicting social forces. Those professions now bearing the brunt of this collision should learn from the
experiences of the medical community. They should seek legislative
relief at least as comprehensive as that already provided in medical
malpractice before the full weight of their respective crises is felt.
The legislature has already demonstrated a high level of responsiveness to a crisis atmosphere and, in the eyes of many, has acted
in a responsible and restrained manner in seeking practical solutions without abandoning the basic precepts of the judicial process.
However, lawmakers will be under increasing pressure to make more
dramatic changes in the system as we now know it as more and more
people are faced with higher insurance premiums.
A critical evaluation is needed of each component of each of the
interrelated social systems for compensating injuries or losses. 5 We
in the legal community must do our part by making certain that
each and every element of the tort system-and of the entire judicial
process-provides just compensation to an injured party in the most
efficient and least costly manner. No reasonable person will substitute efficiency for justice. Yet we must be equally careful not to
equate "tradition" with "the best and only way of doing things."
Some say that we must hold on dearly to what we have now
64. At this writing, the Board of Governors of The Florida Bar is considering the establishment of a lawyer-owned insurance company to write professional liability insurance for Florida attorneys in light of a rapidly deteriorating situation in the private market.
65. See, e.g., Chittenden, The Designated Compensable Event in Medical Malpractice,
13 FORUM 919 (1977-78) (suggests a workmen's compensation-type fee schedule for the remuneration of malpractice injuries).
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because it will all be gone in a few years. It is more rational, however, to modify the existing system in a reasonable manner to insure
that it works in the best interests of all involved than to wait for
others to impose a new system which may not work in the interest
of anyone.

